Part 9

The Mahāyāna - Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and Mādhyamaka

By Quyen Ngo

Mahāyāna emerged as a separate trend of thought between 100 BCE and 100 CE (Conze, 1962: 199). Among its vast literature is a class of texts of great philosophical importance, called the Prajñāpāramitā(Perfection of Wisdom) Sūtras, believed to date back to the first century BCE (Gethin, 1998: 234). ). The Prajñāpāramitā presents the ultimate truth as seen by the awakened mind (p. 236). It sets out to transform wisdom into the ‘perfection of wisdom’ by complementing the analytical wisdom with relational wisdom, both of which are found in the Abhidharma (Santina, 1997: 143). However, the Prajñāpāramitā sees the Abhidharma, primarily Sarvāstivādin, as not presenting the ultimate understanding of everything is not-self (Harvey, 1990: 97). Hence, one of its main focuses is on the ontological status of dharmas.

The philosophical assertions of the Prajñāpāramitā was later explicated by Nāgārjuna (c. CE 150-250), the founder of the Mādhyamaka school, whose principle work is the Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikā (Root Verses on the Middle)[1] . His fundamental message is to discard any notion of inherent existence, or own-being (svabhāva), by examining Dependent Arising (prat´ya-samutpāda), in a critical, didactic way, beginning with the idea of inherent existence, and ending with the idea of emptiness (śūnyatā) (Santina, 1997: 156). This he did using three types of investigations: (i) investigation of causality, (ii) investigation of concepts, and (iii) the investigation of knowledge (Santina, 1997: 158).

To illustrate the relational method employ by the Prajñāpāramitā and Nāgārjuna, we can use the analogy of a chariot. By the analytical method, we come to the conclusion that a chariot is composed of various parts. By the relational method, we come to the conclusion that because a ‘chariot’ only comes to being by its parts it is therefore ‘empty’ of inherent existence. In that sense that a ‘chariot’ is only a notion because it does not exist independently. If we proceed further, we would find that even the individual parts are seen as empty (Santina, 1997: 143).

(i) Empty dharmas

According to the Abhidharma, all physical and mental phenomena consist of self-existent (svabhāva) dharmas (Gethin, 1998: 242) which act as the basic building-block of reality. The Prajñāpāramitā, however, sees this as not understanding the notion of ‘non-selfness of dharmas ‘(dharma-nairātmya), because this in effect amounts to asserting a virtual self (Harvey, 1990: 97). Through an extension of the relational method, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras defines the ontological status of the dharmas as ‘empty’ of any own-being (niḥ-svabhāva), that is, as they depend on something other than themselves (Conze, 1962: 220), just as a ‘chariot’ doesn’t exist independently.

Nāgārjuna sees the Abhidharma theory as still pertaining to the conventional truth rather than the ultimate truth (Gethin, 1998: 239). He argues that as dharmas arise dependent on conditions, they can have no inherent existence. If something inherently exists then it cannot change, as change would mean it has gone out of existence. Therefore, there can be no true existence and non-existence (Harvey, 1990: 97).

Nāgārjuna systematically refutes other possibilities put forward by other opponents with regards to cause and effect using the fourfold dialectical analysis, the reductio ad absurdum. For example, in the beginning of the Mūlamadhyamakakārika Nāgārjuna refutes the four basic alternatives for the origination of phenomena:

Neither from itself nor from another,
Nor from both,
Nor without a cause,
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.[2]

According to Nāgārjuna, the cause and effect cannot be identical, as this would mean father and son are identical. The cause and effect cannot be entirely different either, as this would mean one could obtain rice from coal, which is an absurd idea. The third alternative is a combination of the first two, both of which have previously been refuted, and is therefore invalid. The fourth alternative, that phenomena can arise without a cause is refuted on the basis of common sense (Santina, 1997: 160).

As dharmas have no true existence they are said to be mere words, and are the products of conventional expression (vyavahāra) (Conze, 1962: 221). They have never been produced and never come into existence[3] . However, on a conventional level things do exist. Thus, their appearance is said to resemble things in a dream, which although appear to exist during sleep, are illusory and empty of any substantial, independent existence. Therefore, ‘a Bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom comprehended all dharmas as like a dream…’ (Conze, 1975: 305). The aggregates too, are seen to be empty, ‘because of the own-being of the five skandhas is nonexistent [and thus] the five skandhas are [also seen as] similar to a dream…’ (Conze, 1975: 113).