The fundamental principles of Buddhist psychology and their relevance to Buddhism as a religion Prof. Y. Karunadasa and Corey Bell 1. Introduction This article presents a summary elucidation of the key principles of early-Buddhist psychology, and a brief discussion of the overall significance and main functions this psychology has with regards to Buddhism as a religion. It shall begin by bringing attention to how this psychology’s flavour and distinctiveness draws from its application and elaboration of the key Buddhist concepts of ‘non-self’ (ātman) and ‘dependant origination’ (paticca samuppāda) by elucidating three of its fundamental underlying principles: 1) the conditional nature of consciousness with regards to the duality of sense organ and object; 2) consciousness’s non-independent nature; particularly with regards to its inextricable interdependence with the other four aggregates of existence (ie, form, feeling, perception, and volition), and; 3) consciousness’s mutual dependence with nāma-rūpa (mental factors and elements of matter). Drawing upon the implications of these principles and further scriptural evidence, it shall then discuss the three main ways in which this psychology contributes to Buddhism as a ‘religion’: 1) in terms of underlying a systematic articulation of, and solution to, what Buddhism perceives to be the root causes of man’s fundamental existential problem; a fact that challenges the assertions put forward by some modern scholars that early Buddhism was of a strict behaviouralist inclination narrowly focusing on the observation of precepts (sīla); 2) defining the Buddhist ‘worldview’ in terms of the impact of the mind on the world of experience - a position, in conjunction with the first point, relevant to refuting the perception that early Buddhism had a ‘nihilistic’ or more broadly pessimistic inclination, and; 3) by supporting Buddhism’s identity and claims to pre-eminence as a philosophy/ religion amongst other philosophies/ religions, and indeed as a ‘middle doctrine’ between extreme views, through underlying the Buddha’s critique of the contemporaneous and dichotomous philosophical trends of sassatavāda, or spiritualist ideologies, and ucchedavāda, or materialist beliefs. 2. Not-self, dependant origination and the fundamental principles of Buddhist psychology 2.1 The guiding role of not-self and dependant origination in Buddhist psychology As decisively established by Y. Karunadasa in his work ‘The Buddhist Critique of sassatavāda and ucchedavāda: The Key to a proper Understanding of the Origin and the Doctrines of early Buddhism’(1), Buddhism arose as a critical response to the mutual conflict between the spiritualist and materialist ideologies of contemporary India (sassatavāda and ucchedavāda respectively); the doctrinal foundation of this response being defined principally by means of: a) Buddhism’s demarcation from these ideologies’ common affirmation of the existence of a ‘self’ or ‘soul’ (ātman) through the promotion of the doctrine of ‘not-self’ (anatta), and; b) its transcendence of these views and their extreme personal and social ramifications via the ‘middle doctrine’ (majjhima-dhamma) – which describes the doctrine of ‘dependant origination’ (paṭicca samuppāda). Indeed, as noted by Nyanatiloka, in Buddhist philosophy, these two elements could be deemed to refer to different aspects of a single truth; the first (anatta) proceeding ‘analytically’ to reduce the supposed self to a series of impersonal and impermanent elements, whilst the other (paṭicca samuppāda) proceeds ‘synthetically’ to show ‘that all these phenomena are, in some way or other, conditionally related to each other’(2). Collectively and individually, thus, these two themes constitute important and pervasive defining attributes of the Buddhist teachings, and also serve as key standards and conceptual tools by means of which ‘truth’ is appraised in the Buddhist tradition. In early-Buddhist psychology, it is particularly poignant that both these key aspects of Buddhist thought, and the matter of their integration, are central to defining its flavour and distinctiveness; particularly in contrast to the psychological understandings that certainly stemmed (in addition to those that most probably would have stemmed) from the sassatavāda and ucchedavāda positions. In particular, the elaboration of these doctrines in the context of Buddhist psychology gave birth to three basic principles which I will elaborate in this section; 1. the conditional nature of consciousness with regards to the duality of sense organ and object; 2. consciousness’s non-independent nature in terms of its inextricable interrelationship with the other four aggregates of the five aggregate series and; 3. consciousness’s mutual dependence with nāma-rūpa. 2.2 The conditional nature of consciousness with regards to the duality of sense organ and object Rather than existing as the concomitant active manifestation of a permanent/semi-permanent independent substance or identity (ātman), or as being produced mainly as a product of its own momentum or ‘self-as-cause’ (as propositioned in some later Abhidharma schools), consciousness in early Buddhism is seen as necessarily arising in dependence of conditions; a concept captured by the key phrase aññatra paccaya nātthi viññāṇassa saṃbhavo (lit: there is no arising of consciousness without reference to a condition). Specifically, consciousness is deemed to arise in dependence on a ‘duality’ defining the simultaneous co-existence of a sense organ and its corresponding sense object. The following point is made in the Pāli Suttas:
From this we can see that consciousness as it is regarded in Buddhism, particularly in virtue of both its essential ‘conditioning’ and transience or ‘impermanence’ (anicca), has neither the requisite stability, self-efficacy or continuity to be associated with the notion of a ‘soul’ or ‘self-entity’. Indeed, the understanding of this connection between the ‘conditionality’ of consciousness and its not corresponding to a ‘soul’ or self is clearly articulated in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta, where the Buddha introduces the notion of the conditionality of consciousness on a sense organ and corresponding sense object in the context of a critique of a Bhikkhu’s belief that ‘consciousness transmigrates through existences, not anything else’ (ie, essentially constitutes a ‘soul’ in a spiritualistsense). Further emphasising this conditionality, as well as undermining the notion that an unchanging, homogenising ‘unity’ (ie, self nature) exists in consciousness as a basis of its association with a ‘self’ notion, the Buddha went on to state in this Sutta that ‘consciousness’ should be reckoned by the conditions attributing to its arising (ie, ‘eye consciousness’ for consciousness dependant on the visual organ and visual object) ‘just as a fire is reckoned based on whatever that fire burns - fire ablaze on sticks is a stick fire, fire ablaze on twigs is a twig fire…’ etc. This point is pressed home by the fact that immediately following this passage we see an explicit reference to the doctrine of dependant origination. 2.3 Consciousness’s non-independent nature; the inextricable interrelationship between consciousness and the four other aggregates. In addition to being impermanent and conditioned, consciousness according to Buddhist thought can neither be equated as the abiding place of an individuated and metaphysical ‘self’ or ‘soul’, as propositioned by the berated Bhikkhu mentioned above, as it has in fact no independent existence of any kind, residing perpetually in an inextricable interrelationship with the four other aggregates into which an individual may be (conventionally) analysed. These four aggregates are as follows: 1. form/corporeality (rūpa); 2. feeling (vedanā); 3. perceptions (saññā), and; 4. volition/mental formations (saṃkhāra). The Pāli Sutta’s state the following:
In Buddhist literature we see the statements sabbe saṅkhara anicca and, more popularly, anicca vata saṅkhara. As stated by Y. Karunadasa, ‘both these formulae amount to saying that all conditioned things or phenomenal processes, mental as well as material, that go to make up the samsaric plane of existence are transient or impermanent’. Indeed, the above statement plainly rejects the spiritualist position akin to the berated Bhikkhu’s statement that a unitary consciousness ‘transmigrates through existence’, and states consciousness is merely one of many constituent elements of the ‘psychophysical continuum’ perpetuated through dependant origination, being itself without an independent, self defining essence as is the case of other forms of impersonal phenomena. Being without such an essence, it is thus also portrayed as being incapable of functioning as a receptacle for a ‘soul’ or self-defining individuality. Another related basis underlying the view consciousness cannot exist independently is the Buddhist theory of a mutual dependence between consciousness on the one hand, and on the other hand what is known as nāma-rūpa (viññāṇa-paccaya nāma-rūpaṃ; nāma-rūpam-paccaya viññāṇaṃ); the latter of which may be described as the combination of a conventionally designated ‘person’ or ‘sentient being’s’ key mental-factors and elements of matter. According to Buddhist theory, nāma, or mental factors, is a collective name for five elements: feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), volition (cetanā), sense-impression (phassa) and mental advertance or attention (manasikāra), whilst rūpa refers to the primary elements of matter (mahābhūta); earth, water, fire and wind; in addition to secondary material phenomena (upada rūpa) upon whose existence these four elements depend. With regards to this formula of mutual independence, it can be seen that Buddhism rejects the notion that consciousness exists in the form of an eternal/semi-permanent ground or base of experience, or a subjective ‘self’. Indeed, according to this paradigm consciousness cannot be described as having any of the qualities of a ‘self’ in terms of being a) a ‘subject’ of mental factors such as feelings, volitions, etc, b) a ‘source’ for them, nor c) a ‘container’ of them, for its own existence is itself dependant on their very functioning. Similarly, consciousness can neither be perceived as an ‘appropriator’, ‘creator’ (in an idealist sense) or completely subjective ‘experiencer’ of material phenomena, nor can it be seen to be either in an essential dichotomy with form (duality principle - as is the spiritualist view, orsassatavāda), nor a product of it (identity principle - as is the view of materialist ideologies, orucchedavāda). This last point in particular is of considerable significance for understanding Buddhist psychology’s formation in the context of the Buddha’s response to the religio-philosophical milieu of his time, and shall be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. 3. The relevance of Buddhist psychology to Buddhism as a religion As with the foundational theories of dependant origination and not-self that inform it, Buddhism’s ‘psychology’ also both cuts to the core of the Buddhist soteriological mission, and has a variety of applications in its broader religious framework. Certainly with regards to the former this key role logically progresses according to the rational Buddhist approach to humanity’s existential problem, which may be condensed as follows:
Yet to understand both the parameters and distinguishing features of the Buddhist psychological approach to man’s existential problem under this framework we must again return to the Buddhist response vis-à-vis the sassatavāda and ucchedavāda viewpoints. Firstly and most distinctively, it is apparent that having rejected the notion of ‘self’ common to these positions as mentioned above, early Buddhism had to, in the words of Y. Karunadasa ‘psychologise without the psyche’ – it both needed to explain the nature of the mind without ‘positing the notion of the soul’, and at the same time account for the near universal belief in, and functioning of, this ‘self’ notion. In doing so, other parameters more specifically defining the sassatavāda and ucchedavāda positions had to be observed – namely, Buddhist psychology had to work within the bounds of an ‘empirical’ approach deprived of the conveniences of metaphysical attribution or speculation (ie, available to sassatavādins or ‘spiritualists’), and at the same time avoid condemning psychological processes to the eternal mechanical repetition of ‘stimuli-response’ reactions (which would rationalize or naturalize the ucchedavāda doctrine of kāmasukhalikanuyoga, or sensual indulgence). Based on the foundation of the above principles, the conflation of these key notions – the matter of the perception and psychological response to sensual stimuli (or more correctly, ‘objects’), in addition to the formation and functioning of a ‘self’ notion, play a prominent role in the Buddhist depiction of both the nature and solution to man’s existential problem. Also, and reflecting this above mentioned formative dialectic context, they underlie Buddhism adapting a predominantly psychological approach to two other ‘religious’ aspects of its doctrine – a) Buddhism’s understanding of the world, which we may define in terms of an articulation of how the mind impacts on the world of experience, and b) Buddhism’s critique or response to the viewpoints of competing philosophical schools, which includes what Y. Karunadasa has coined the theory of the ‘psychological mainspring of views and speculative ideologies’, and, more positively, the establishment of a new theory concerning the mind-body relationship. We will now briefly discuss each of these theories. 3.1 The early Buddhist theory of sense perception and cognition – a Buddhist articulation of psychological suffering In addition to the more prominent twelve-factor formulae of dependant origination, one early Buddhist theory for describing the process of the formation of psychological suffering in accordance with the notions detailed above begins with sensory contact, develops through the consolidation and application of the ‘self’ notion, and culminates at a stage of ‘conceptual proliferation’ (papañca). The following passage appears in the Pāli Sutta’s:
This process, it can be seen, contains seven distinct steps: 1) (eye) consciousness (cakkhu-viññāṇa); 2. sensory contact (phassa); 3. feeling (vedanā); 4. perception (saññā); 5. investigation (vitakka), 6. conceptual proliferation (papañca), 7. ‘The overwhelming impact, on the percipient individual, of the conceptual proliferations’(4). These steps can be further reduced to three stages: 1. the formation of consciousness (step one), 2. contact (step 2), and 3. the arising of the ‘I’ notion as a pretext for conceptual proliferation (3-7). Following is a brief analysis of the internal mechanics defining and linking each of these stages: 1. (eye) consciousness (cakkhu-viññāṇa) 2. sensory contact (phassa) 3. feeling (vedanā) –> overwhelming impact of conceptual proliferations on the percipient individual This stage arises immediately after contact. Upon the arising of feeling a previously impersonal process begins to become in a conventional sense ‘personalised’ by the introduction or creation of an ‘I’ notion, or a ‘subject’ of sensual experience. As stated by Venerable Nanananda, it is at this stage that ‘the latent illusion of the ego awakens and thereafter the duality between ego and non-ego is maintained until it is fully crystallised and justified’ at the stage of conceptual proliferation. The conditioned nature of consciousness, dependant origination and the other factors defined by the principles of psychology discussed above are at this stage obscured by the delusional segregation of reality into this dichotomy of ‘external’ perceptual experience, and a ‘subjective’ experiencer, giving rise to the notion that ‘a subject distinct from the cognitive act itself is the persisting experiencer of each fleeting occasion of cognition’ – roughly corresponding to what Buddhism describes as the notion of ‘unthought thinker, and the unknown knower’ (a description of the idea of a ‘soul’). Rational support essential for the stabilization and justification for this idea of a ‘self’ or ‘soul’ is then found and consolidated by the identification of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ with the five aggregates of grasping (ie, form, feeling, perception, etc). From these notions in turn craving develops, and from attachment to the objects of craving are born the essential consequences of the fear of the loss of, separation from, or annihilation of what is ‘self’ or what is desirable, and the repulsion of what is unpleasant or ego-reducing. Thus as a consequence of the formation of such untamed ‘conceptual proliferation’, an ‘ego-centric perspective’ begins to impinge on our perception and judgement, and the percipient begins to be overwhelmed by sentimental longings, expectations, fears for the future etc. – this mental karmic activity eventually spilling out into physical and verbal expression. To loosely borrow a Buddhist phrase from another context ‘thus arises this whole mass of suffering’. In the context of modern academic approaches to early Buddhism, understanding this formulae for the development of psychological suffering is important for countering a claim that continues to be held by some (particularly those following pre-and post modern Chinese and Japanese exegesis) that early Buddhism was strongly ‘behaviouralistic’ in its orientation, focusing mainly on the observation of precepts. Indeed, not only can such a position be exposed by a brief perusal of the Pali Suttas (the Buddha’s indirect denial of certain Jainin positions and his rebuttal of a disciple for his views concerning consciousness spring foremost to mind), but by virtue of this theory it can be seen to be directly contradicted. Early Buddhism, it can be seen, required not only the discipline or restraint of the body and senses (which would put it merely on a pair with the rejected sassatavāda position of attakilamathanuyoga, or self mortification), but purported the application of attention and intelligence to the important yet complicated task of rooting out the ‘self’ notion from the realm of conscious mental activity, down to its very roots at the pre-reflective level. We may indeed postulate that this ‘psychological’ battle constitutes the very culmination of the path to nirvana as pointed out by the Buddha. 3.2 The impact of mind on the world in the Buddha’s worldview Above we have mentioned that early Buddhism, in view of its position vis-à-vis sassatavāda and ucchedavāda, had to analyse the human mind without positing the notion of a self, or ‘psychologise without a psyche’. We have also been introduced to the notion that Buddhism, having promising the enlightened individual emancipation from the vicissitudes of his environment, had to, in dealing with the interaction of a (conventionally designated) percipient and the external, empirical world, establish a way out of the eternal perpetuation of a physical ‘stimuli-reaction’ response; the denial of which would amount to the naturalization and rationalization of a process, based on the notion of the existence of a purely biological self, justifying the ucchedavāda doctrine of kamasukhallikanuyoga, or (unrestrained) sensual indulgence. Having denied the spiritualist or mystic’s metaphysical solution to this problem, the Buddha had to find another way to account for the problem of the perpetuation of the ‘external world’ whilst offering an explanation of the apparent subsiding of its causal efficacy in the pre-reflective ‘stimuli-response’ process. To do so, and very much in accordance to the seven-point process detailed above, Buddhism developed an important doctrinal position, that articulating a new theory regarding the impact of the mind on the external world. Interestingly, this may be said to, in a sense, capture the spirit of the Buddha’s ‘middle path’, for it defines a unique Buddhist approach to the world that avoids the extremes of naïve realism and outright idealism (the later of which consolidated in the development of the Yogācārin position). In early Buddhism the role of the subjective ‘mind’ as an agent in shaping the ‘world’ (loka) is nowhere more strongly put than in the statements cittena niyata loko, cittena parikissata – ‘the world is lead by the mind, the world is activated by the mind’. What is important for interpreting this statement, and perhaps a key to refuting the metaphysical interpretation of the teachings underlying the Yogācāra’s later absolute idealism, is that in many sutras this concept of ‘world’ itself is clearly defined in a more epistemological and subjective sense of constituting the sum of one’s experiences of the world. The following quote appears in the Suttas:
Indeed, it is on the basis of this understanding that we should interpret an important statement of the Buddha: ‘in this fathom long body I declare the world’. At the same time we should recognize that just as this statement incorporates in the Buddhist ‘worldview’ the ‘impersonal’ sensual organs, sensual objects and consciousness (and by extension, contact) that make up the first two stages of the seven stage theory of perception discussed above, other stages are included also, hinting at the aforementioned role of the ‘egocentred perspective’, based on the view of a ‘self’, that forms and develops upon the arising of feeling, and consolidates through the grasping of the sense objects and the aggregates in general. This fact is indeed testified by the Buddha’s stating that not only ‘that by which one is conscious of the world’ constitutes ‘what is called world in the Noble One’s Discipline’, but also that ‘by which one has conceit of the world’. This last point is significant when we return to the issue of early Buddhism’s response to the challenge of explaining the enlightened being’s emancipation from the apparent pre-reflective and mechanical process of the personalized reaction to stimuli that leads to conceptual proliferation up to the conscious level. The ego, brought into play at the stage of feeling and consolidated by attachment to the aggregates, brings its perspective into our perceptual experience, inspiring what Y.Karunadasa calls ‘the constructive activity of the subjective imagination’, leading to what Buddhism calls distortional thinking maññana, and thus a distorted view of the external ‘world’. This understanding of the Buddhist ‘worldview’ has particularly important implications when we revisit the Buddhist articulation of the notion of emancipation or nibbāna; especially in the context of criticisms Buddhism constitutes a ‘nihilistic’ religion. Nibbāna has been described in the Pāli Suttas by the terms lokuttara – transcending the world, and loka nirodha – cessation of the world. While we can be sure, in the context of the Buddhist critique of the sassatavāda position, that this former term does not connote the existence of a metaphysical ‘transcendental’ realm or state, the above given interpretation of the early Buddhist understanding and application of the concept ‘world’ tells us this second notion – that of the ‘cessation’ of the world, neither amounts to the total ‘annihilation’ of a being or a ‘world’ in a ontological sense, referring merely to the cessation of the egocentric perspective’s ingression in our perceptual experience. Nibbāna can thus be defined as a state where we truly ‘know the world’ (loka vidu), having the ability to be cognizant of things as they really are (yathā-bhutanna). 3.3 Buddhist psychology and claims to religious veracity: a new middle doctrine and the Buddhist critique of the psychological mainspring of views and speculative ideologies As mentioned above, it has been established that Buddhism arose as a critical response to the mutual conflict between the competing ideologies of the contemporary spiritualists (sassatavāda) and anti-religious materialist (ucchedavāda). We noted that the first Sutta of the first Nikāya – the Brahmajala Sutta, contained the views of 62 competing philosophical views contemporaneous to the Buddha, underlying the fact that Buddhism arose with an acute sense of, and critical engagement with, the intellectual milieu of the times, seeking to establish itself as a philosophy/religion amongst various philosophies/religions. What is truly unique about Buddhism, however, is that unlike these other schools, Buddhism did not seek to establish the veracity of its philosophical positions or any religious edicts on the basis of the categorical rejection or affirmation of any of these competing philosophical views or speculative ideologies. Rather, it set itself aside from each of these other schools by critiquing them on the basis of the establishment and application of a unique new doctrine – that purporting a psychological source or mainspring for the development of all philosophical views and speculative ideologies. In the Avyakata Saṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikaya we find a passage in which the wanderer Vacchagotta asks Venerable Moggallana why the Buddha left various questions regarding certain philosophical or speculative questions unanswered when they had been answered in a specific manner by other teachers. The reply given was that ‘unlike other religious teachers, the Buddha does not consider the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body and the mind as ‘This is mine,” “This I am,” This is my self”.’(5) In summary, this implies that the Buddha was free from what Buddhism calls sakkāya-diṭṭhi - the personality view. Returning to the seven-staged theory of perception and cognition discussed above, here we can see the above mentioned discussion regarding the ingression of the egocentric perspective on reality being applied to the formulation of speculative views and ideologies. Pronouncements of the nature of reality are thus perceived as being conditioned by the egocentric perspective, and driven by a strong and uncompromising view of ‘self’ and ‘mine’, in turn culminating in the creation of what the Buddha denoted as ‘individual truths’ (pacceka-saccas) – personal views or speculative theories dogmatically clung to by various ‘controversialist debaters’. Having established that all other competing views are false, holders of such ‘individual truths’ are moved to attack each other, thus generating the proliferation of a host or arguments and attacks amongst the philosophical/religious communities. Finally, Buddhist psychology helps to underlie Buddhism’s religio-philosophical belief vis-à-vis the ideologies of ucchedavāda and sassatavāda in another important sense; by denying the positions taken by both ideologies with regards to the relationship between the mind and body. Buddhism avoids both the ‘duality principle’ of the sassatavāda position, which asserts that mental and material realities are strictly separate entities, and at the same time rejects the materialist (ucchedavāda) theory that these two are reducible to one reality. Adopting the ‘middle position’, Buddhism draws strongly from the above mentioned foundational principle of the interdependence of consciousness and rūpa (materiality), stating that both exist in a relationship of mutual dependence or ‘reciprocal conditionality’. This in turn serves as an important doctrinal foundation for refuting the theories of a permanent ‘individuality’ and of the total annihilation of a ‘self entity’ at the body’s decay, representing the positions of sassatavāda and ucchedavāda respectively(6), providing an important doctrinal foundation for attacking the harmful and extreme doctrines of self-immolation and unrestrained self gratification. 4. Conclusion In conclusion we may see that early Buddhist psychology encapsulates the core Buddhist notions of not-self, impermanence and dependant origination through its establishment and articulation of three fundamental principles: 1. the conditional nature of consciousness with regards to the duality of sense organ and object; 2. consciousness’s non-independent nature; particularly with regards to its inextricable interdependence with the other four aggregates of existence, and; 3) consciousness’s mutual dependence with nāma-rūpa (mental factors and elements of matter). On the basis of these principles and guiding tenets, Buddhist psychology produced a theory for the arising and cessation of mental suffering, defined in terms of the overwhelming proliferation of conceptualizations, that goes to the core of the Buddha’s soteriological mission, and thus the very essence of Buddhism as a religion. In addition, and on the basis of these same principles, Buddhist psychology also contributes to Buddhism as a religion in a broader sense by offering a unique epistemological/psychological interpretation of the concept of the ‘world’ that emphasizes the role of the subjective ‘ego’ in the distortion of both the perception and cognition of reality. This understanding is also applied to the analysis of views and speculative ideologies, thus having an important role in Buddhism’s defining itself through a critique of contemporary religio-philosophical movements, and for promoting the veracity of its claims as a soteriologically effective ‘middle path’. In a positive sense, Buddhist psychology also attributes to the articulation of this ‘middle path’ philosophy (vis-à-vis the views of sassatavāda and ucchedavāda) through asserting a relationship of interdependence or mutual conditionality between mental and material realities, or ‘mind’ and ‘body’.
1. The Middle Way, U.K., vol 74 & 75, 1999-2000. 2. Nyanatiloka. Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines. Columbia: Frewin & Co., (1956), pg. 119. 3. (XXXV 93-Samyutta-Nikaye). Quoted from Y. Karundasa, The Buddhist Doctrine of Anicca or Impermanence, and the Soul Theory 4. Y. Karunadasa, lecture notes, 2005. 5. Quoted from Y. Karunadasa, The unanswered questions: Why were they unanswered? Anew Interpretation based on a Re-examination of the Textual Data. 6. Having been discussed extensively in previous essays, these positions, as well as Buddhism’s ‘middle path’ and ‘middle doctrine’ responses, need not be elaborated here.
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